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Abstract
This paper evaluates the strategies employed by households in rural China to al-
locate educational expenditure to children of different physical endowments, ex-
amining whether parents use educational funding to reinforce or compensate for
these differences. Climatic shocks are employed as an instrument for endowment,
measured as height-for-age, allowing for the identification of the impact of quasi-
exogenous variation in endowment on parental allocations conditional on household
fixed effects. The results suggest that educational expenditure is directed to the
relatively weaker child; in response to the mean difference in height-for-age be-
tween siblings, parents redirect around 25% of discretionary educational spending
to the child with lower height-for-age, and this effect is robust to the potentially
confounding effects of gender and birth order. There is some evidence that time
allocation may also be a relevant margin of compensation, but no evidence that
medical expenditure responds to differences in height-for-age.
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1 Introduction
For decades, social scientists have analyzed the decisions that households make about
human capital accumulation and the implications of these decisions for individual eco-
nomic outcomes (Strauss and Thomas, 1995). Given that the majority of educational
investments are made in childhood, it is particularly crucial to understand the choices
that parents make about education on behalf of their children – choices that, in multi-
child families, entail not only identifying resources for education in the form of money or
parental time, but allocating those resources among multiple children.
This paper provides evidence about the parental allocation of resources for education
among children of varying endowments in a low-resource setting in rural China, seeking
to identify whether parents employ a compensatory or a reinforcing strategy in response
to variations in endowment among their children. I define endowment as the physical
health of the child as shaped by his/her genes as well as the conditions faced in utero
and early in life. The analysis thus seeks to explore how parents respond to variations
in children’s endowment resulting from the conjunction of the genetic lottery and early
childhood shocks.
However, direct estimation of the relationship between parental behavior and relative
health or physical robustness among children poses serious challenges. Any measurement
of child endowment captured after birth will inevitably include a component of endoge-
nous parental nurturing; thus, a parental preference may manifest itself in a higher en-
dowment for a given child and in overtly preferential treatment of the same child. This
generates spurious evidence of a positive relationship between a child’s endowment and
parental investments.
The principal methodological contribution of this paper is to address the endogeneity
of any measurement of a child’s endowment by employing as an instrument a variable
capturing exogenous variation in resource availability correlated with physical health.
The instrument used is grain yield as well as predicted grain yield in utero and in infancy
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for each child, an index of nutritional availability during a critical period of childhood de-
velopment that substantially determines physical endowment. There is a broad consensus
in the existing medical literature that malnutrition in the first years of life, particularly
during the prenatal period and between birth and age three, has a substantial negative
impact on physical and cognitive development (Pollitt et al., 1999; Grantham-McGregor
and Ani, 2001). Shocks to a child’s nutritional intake in this period are correlated with
endowment, but exogenous to other intrahousehold decisions, given the use of household
fixed effects that absorb shocks to the household’s overall budget constraint.
The results show a clear pattern of spending allocations favoring the child with lower
endowment, consistent with a parental preference for equality that seeks to compensate
for variation in endowment induced by early childhood climatic shocks. This pattern of
preferential allocations holds across multiple measures of expenditure, and is robust to
the potentially confounding effects of gender and birth parity. There is also some evidence
that time allocation may be a mechanism for parental compensation. However, parents
do not seem to exhibit compensatory behavior in the allocation of medical expenditure.
Previous literature examining intrahousehold allocation of resources to offspring has
largely focused on the question of differential allocation to male versus female children,
with a substantial literature establishing a pattern of preferential allocations to male
children in both South and East Asia (Hazarika, 2000; Behrman and Deolalikar, 1990;
Ono, 2004). Other studies have examined the impact of the sex ratio of siblings on a
child’s education, finding that a child with more sisters has better health and educa-
tion outcomes than one with more brothers (Garg and Morduch, 1998; Morduch, 2000),
though the inverse relationship appears to hold in the United States (Butcher and Case,
1994). A separate literature has focused on the relationship between birth order and the
intrafamily distribution of resources (Parish and Willis, 1993; Tenikue and Verheyden,
2007; Bommiere and Lambert, 2004).
A smaller literature has analyzed whether parents have a general preference for equal-
ity among their children. An early paper by Griliches presented evidence that parents
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attempted to limit intrafamily equality and attenuate preexisting differences in endow-
ment, noting that the effect of IQ on schooling is significantly lower within families
(Griliches, 1979). Behrman, Pollak and Taubman (1982) examine familial allocations
using twin data from the U.S. and reject the pure investment model in which parents
care only about the total return to educational expenditure, employing functional form
assumptions on the parental welfare function. Using developing-country data, Rosen-
zweig and Wolpin (1988) find that parents in Colombia attempt to compensate for the
disadvantages suffered by children with lower weight at birth by a longer interval prior to
the birth of the next child, though there is contravening evidence that healthier children
are more often breastfed. Behrman (1988) finds evidence in India of a pro-male bias as
well as parental inequality aversion, though such aversion declines in the lean season.
Two more recent papers analyzing the response of parental human capital investments
to children’s variation in endowments found that parents exhibit reinforcing behavior.
Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) find that parents exhibit higher educational expenditure for
children of higher birth weight in China. They do not address the potential endogeneity
of birth weight for siblings born as singletons – if, for example, children born at a certain
parity or a certain stage of parental development are more wanted, the mothers could
receive better prenatal nutrition, leading to higher birth weight for the child as well as
enhanced subsequent endowments – but find parallel results for twin pairs for which
endogenous determination of birth weight can be ruled out. Conti et al. (2010) also
employ data from China to estimate a structural model of parental resource allocation
given multidimensional child endowments, and find evidence of compensating investment
in health but reinforcing investment in education. They exploit early health shocks,
defined as a reported episode of serious disease, assumed to occur randomly within twin
pairs.
In employing climatic shocks at birth as a source of variation in children’s health
endowment, this paper joins a robust literature that has examined the impact of early
childhood shocks (climatic, economic, or political) on longer-term outcomes. Almond
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et al. (2006) and Meng and Qian (2009) have analyzed the long-term impact of famine
caused by the Great Leap Forward in China. Almond (2006) and Almond and Chay
(2006) exploit shocks to public health and social policy in the U.S. over time, while
Banerjee et al. (2010) evaluate the impact of income shocks in nineteenth-century France
caused by a vineyard-destroying insect. Most similar in spirit to this paper may be the
work of Maccini and Yang (2009), which shows a relationship between early childhood
shocks and long-run economic impacts in Indonesia. However, this paper is one of the
first in this literature to show evidence of a relationship between in-utero shocks and
physical robustness as measured by height-for-age.
Furthermore, this paper makes several contributions to the existing literature on
parental intrahousehold allocation. It is the first study to estimate the response of
parental allocations to quasi-exogenous variation in endowment without relying on the
use of twin pairs. In addition, it builds on the existing literature about early childhood
shocks, exploiting these shocks to address the potential endogeneity of a child’s endow-
ment. Finally, it provides robust evidence of an effect of climatic shocks, even in utero,
on medium-term health outcomes as measured by height-for-age.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Sections 3 and 4 present
the main empirical results and robustness checks. The final section concludes.
2 Data
The data set employed in this analysis is the Gansu Survey of Children and Families
(GSCF), a panel study of rural children’s welfare outcomes conducted in Gansu province,
China. The first wave, conducted in 2000, surveyed a representative sample of 2000
children in 20 rural counties aged 9–12 as well as their mothers, household heads, teachers,
principals, and village leaders. The second wave, implemented in 2004, supplemented the
first wave with a sample of the younger siblings and fathers of the target children.
The survey employed a four-stage stratified random sample. First, counties were
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selected from the full sampling frame of counties, excluding autonomous minority regions.
Townships within each county (and subsequently, villages within each township) were
ranked according to per-capita income, and a sampling distance was calculated taking
into account the relative population of each unit. Two to three townships within each
county and two villages within each township were sampled, yielding 100 villages. Twenty
children were then sampled in each village, selected randomly from the cohort of children
aged 9–12 during the survey’s first wave.
Gansu, located in northwest China, is one of the poorest and most rural provinces in
China. Per capita income in this sample is around $200 a year, and the mean level of
education observed among parents is only seven years for men and four years for women.
This analysis will focus on a subsample of the families in the survey: those with two
children in the household where both children are observed in the second wave survey.
Here, the child aged 9–12 identified in the first round of the survey is referred to as
the index child; in families where the index child had a younger sibling of school age,
that child was surveyed in the second round. If these two children are the only children
in the household, this constitutes a complete survey of parental allocations and child
endowment, and these households are the primary focus of the analysis. Such complete
data is available on 413 families, and they constitute the relevant subsample. I will
present the key results for a slightly larger sample, including households where these two
children (the index child and the younger sibling) are the youngest two children of a
larger family.1
Clearly, restricting to a subsample raises some question about external validity. How-
ever, it is important to note that the question of intrahousehold allocation among children
is, in fact, irrelevant for the majority of the excluded sample, who are single-child house-
holds. These households do not form part of the theoretical sample of interest: households
1The average number of children in households in this sample is 2.2. While the One-Child Policy was
in effect during the period in which these children were born, many rural households could nonetheless
have two children legally under various exemptions to the policy (Gu et al., 2007). Other households
may simply have defied the rules. It is not possible using this dataset to accurately identify for each
household whether it was technically in compliance with the policy.
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with a number of children greater than one. The primary results will also be shown to
be robust to including households who have a number of children greater than two.
Panel A of Table 1 reports summary statistics for the subsample of two-children
families and the overall sample for key demographic indicators of interest as measured in
the second wave of the survey, as well as a t-test for equality between the two means. No
statistically significant difference is apparent in income, parental education, or the age of
the index child. The only significant difference between the two samples is in parental
age. Parents in the subsample are younger, reflecting the exclusion of households with
larger numbers of children and households who have an older sibling in addition to the
index child; these families will generally be headed by older parents. The index child is
on average 15 during the second wave of the survey, and there is a small difference in
average age comparing the sample and the subample. Height-for-age is also slightly lower
in the subsample relative to the full sample.
The dependent variable of interest is educational expenditure per child per semester,
reported by the head of household in six categories: tuition, educational supplies, food
consumed in school, transportation and housing, tutoring, and other fees.2 Each house-
hold reports separately expenditure for each child in each of these categories. In the
Chinese educational context, supplies, tutoring, and other fees correspond to expenditure
undertaken by the household to improve a child’s academic performance, independent of
the school attended. Expenses for transportation, housing, and food, on the other hand,
may also vary in accordance with the choice of school and the choice of whether or not
to have a child board at school. Discretionary expenditure is defined as the sum of all
expenditure excluding tuition. Summary statistics for average expenditure per child for
the subsample of families analyzed can be found in Panel B of Table 1. Total educational
expenditure averages slightly less than 300 yuan per child per semester, or a total of
1040 yuan for two children over a year. This indicates that an average of 16% of mean
household income is allocated to educational expenditure.
2In China, textbook fees are mandatory and levied as part of the overall tuition, and here they are
likewise reported in the tuition category. “Supplies” represents those other than textbooks.
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The measurement of the child’s endowment is height-for-age, normalized to a Z-score
using the World Health Organization growth charts for children of ages 2–18. Height-for-
age is widely used in the literature as a measure of endowment and a summary indicator of
physical robustness, and it is correlated with a range of physical and cognitive indicators
(World Health Organization, 1995; Grantham-McGregor et al., 2007). It has also been
employed as a measurement of nutritional status and malnutrition for adolescents up
to age 18 (Prista et al., 2003; Sawaya et al., 1995; Leenstra et al., 2005). At the same
time, evidence suggests that height-for-age largely reflects the history of nutrition or
health prior to age three, as after this age, catch-up for a child stunted in infancy is
limited (Martorell, 1999; Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2006). Accordingly, a robust
relationship between height-for-age and early childhood shocks is expected. Summary
statistics on height-for-age for the index child in the sample and the subsample are also
shown in Table 1. The average height-for-age is –1.1, suggesting, perhaps unsurprisingly,
that this is a predominantly stunted population.
The primary data is supplemented by climatic data for Gansu. Grain yield data pre-
1996 is from data tabulated by the Ministry of Agriculture; post-1996, the data is drawn
from annual editions of the Rural Chinese Statistical Yearbook. Grain yield is measured
annually at the county level in tons per hectare. These data are linked to rainfall data
consisting of monthly reports of climate stations in China compiled by the China Climate
Project, interpolated to the latitude and longitude of the villages in the sample using the
inverse-distance weighting method. Data from stations within 200 kilometers of the
county of interest are employed unless there are fewer than three stations in that radius,
in which case the radius is increased to 250 kilometers. On average, each measure of
rainfall at the village level is constructed by interpolating between rainfall reports at six
stations.3 Rainfall is observed for all villages in the sample, but the top and bottom 1%
of all rainfall measures are trimmed to avoid the influence of outliers.
3The minimum number of stations used to construct a rainfall measure is three; the maximum is
nine. The 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution of stations across villages are four and seven,
respectively.
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3 Empirical evidence
3.1 Ordinary least squares
The primary relationship of interest in this analysis is equation (1), where the dependent
variable is the reported expenditure on the education of child i in household h, school
s, county c and born in year t, denoted Eihsct. The independent variable is endowment
as measured by height-for-age, denoted Hihsct. A household fixed effect, denoted ηh,
absorbs any household-level heterogeneity in income or the propensity for educational
spending, and calendar birth month Monihsct and gender Gihsct are included as controls.
The equation of interest is thus the following:
Eihsct = β1Hihsct + β2Monihsct + β3Gihsct + ηh + εihsct (1)
Because the subsample is composed of two-child families, a household fixed effects
specification is equivalent to estimation of the equation in first differences across the
two children. The child-specific error term is denoted εihsct, and standard errors are
clustered at the county level. Any variable that is unchanging within the household (for
example, parental health, parental attitudes toward education, or household wealth) is
thus collinear with the household fixed effect ηh. I do not control for age directly in this
specification, given that age (or year-of-birth) is the primary source of variation in the
climatic shock of interest conditional on household fixed effects.
The equation is estimated for each of the six categories of educational expenditure, as
well as for a dummy variable for enrollment, total expenditure, and total discretionary
expenditure (excluding tuition). The results, shown in Table 2, are generally insignificant.
However, there is the potential for bias in these results. The variable of interest is
early childhood endowment, and height-for-age is believed to be a reasonable proxy,
given that it primarily reflects nutritional availability prior to age three. However, it
is impossible to rule out the hypothesis that height-for-age also embodies a significant
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component of prior parental investment. The child who has already been the target of
greater parental investment will appear to have a greater endowment and, if there is some
serial correlation in parental behavior, is likely to continue to receive more substantial
investments. This will generate an upward bias in the estimated coefficients that may be
problematic. Eliminating this bias is the goal of the identification strategy.
3.2 First stage
The key to identification in this case is the use of a climatic, and thus nutritional, shock
that is correlated with the relative endowment of the two children: grain yield in utero
and in the early years in life. Accordingly, the postulated first stage in its simplest form
is the following, where Sct denotes the climatic shock for children born in county c and
year t, and month of birth and gender are again included as controls.
Hihsct = β1Sct + β2Monihsct + β3Gihsct + εihsct (2)
There are 413 pairs of siblings for which anthropometric data is reported, or 826 children.4
As already noted, the first climatic measure employed is grain yield in the county and
year of birth. Given that such statistics are only reported annually, grain yield in the
first year of life for a given child is calculated as a weighted average of grain yield in the
calendar year of birth and the following year, with the weights depending on the month
of birth. Analogous strategies are used to calculate grain yield in the second year of life
and in utero.5
The use of the grain yield measure may raise questions as to whether grain yield is
correlated with other household or county covariates that could affect children’s outcomes
4An additional four grain yield observations in a single county-year cell are missing; while no sampled
children are born in that year, this yields missing observations for the regressions employing data in
utero and in the second year of life.
5Defining G1 as grain yield in the calendar year of birth and G2 as grain yield in the next calendar year,
the climatic shock in the year of birth is defined as G1 for children born in January, 11/12G1 + 1/12G2
for children born in February, and so on. The results of interest are robust to alternate constructions of
the grain yield variable.
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(e.g., the use of agricultural inputs, or other climatic or topological features). Accordingly,
I will construct a second measure of predicted grain yield, denoted Ŝct, using rainfall as
reported in the villages and years observed in the sample. In order to construct predicted
grain yield, I regress grain yield on rainfall as measured in two periods of the calendar year
(January to June, and July to December), as well as village and year fixed effects. (While
grain yield is reported only at the level of the county and year, rainfall observations are
available for each village in each month.) I then generate predicted values of grain yield
shocks, denoted Ŝct, and regress height-for-age on predicted grain yield as an alternate
first stage. The specification of interest for predicted grain yield can be written as follows.
Hihsct = β1Ŝct + β2Monihsct + β3Gihsct + εihsct (3)
Panel A of Table 3 shows the first stage in cross-section for the raw grain yield
measures, estimating equation (2) with grain yield in utero and in years one and two
of life, respectively, as the independent variables of interest. All specifications include
standard errors clustered at the county level. The results show coefficients on grain yield
that are positive and significant. Moreover, there is no significant difference in the impact
of the climatic shock experienced over the three years examined; the pattern detected is
entirely consistent. The magnitude suggests a 25% increase in grain yield relative to the
mean in a single year in this critical period leads to an increase in height-for-age of around
6%. Panel B of the same table shows the first stage in cross-section for predicted grain
yield, estimating equation (3). The pattern of results is very similar, and the magnitude
of the estimated coefficients is comparable.6
Table 4 shifts the focus to a within-household specification, presenting the results from
the first stage estimated with household fixed effects. The specification is thus analogous
to the ordinary least squares specification already estimated, again employing both grain
yield and predicted grain yield. The full sample of both first-born and second-born
6The number of observations reported for the specifications employing predicted grain yield as the
instrument is slightly lower, given that the trimmed dataset does not include rainfall data for all villages,
and thus does not generate values of predicted grain yield for all villages.
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children is employed, and the specifications of interest are as follows.
Hihsct = β1Sct + β2Monihsct + β3Gihsct + ηh + εihsct (4)
Hihsct = β1Ŝct + β2Monihsct + β3Gihsct + ηh + εihsct (5)
The results in columns (1) through (3) show a positive correlation between the within-
household difference in raw grain yield in the county and year of birth and the observed
difference in height-for-age that is significant for shocks in utero and in the first and
second year of life. In order to maximize predictive power, I then define the total grain
yield shock as the mean of grain yield in years zero (in utero), one, and two, and employ
this variable in an analogous regression. This is the primary first stage of interest, and it
can be seen in column (4) of Table 4. The same specifications are then replicated for the
predicted grain yield measures in columns (5) through (8), and show a similar pattern of
positive and significant coefficients.
Given that the standard errors are clustered at the level of the county, and twenty
counties are observed in the sample, I also examine the robustness of the estimated effects
to a correction for small-sample bias. I use the wild bootstrap procedure suggested by
Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) to bootstrap p-values, and report the correspond-
ing wild bootstrap p-values in brackets in the final row of the table.7 The estimated
specifications are all robust to the use of the wild bootstrap. (Note that the wild boot-
strap procedure generates only a t-statistic and corresponding p-value, not an estimated
standard error; for this reason, only wild bootstrap p-values are reported.)
One potential source of noise in these specifications is the timing of the relevant
harvest vis-a-vis the birth. The definition of the grain yield variable assumes that the
most important shock is the quality of the harvest, as proxied by grain yield, following
conception and birth; thus, the measurement of grain yield proceeds forward from the
date of conception or the date of birth and calculates average grain yield for the next
7The bootstrap is implemented using code adapted from that made public by Douglas Miller in
conjunction with the 2008 paper.
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nine or twelve months. However, given that grain crops are primarily harvested in the
third quarter, it is possible that for children conceived later in the calendar year, the
most important harvest actually precedes their conception, generating the grain stock
that subsequently feeds the pregnant mother. (Analogously, one could argue that the
most important harvest for the first year of life could precede birth for children born
late in the year, generating the grain stock that feeds the infant.) In order to test this
hypothesis, I estimate equation (12) adding an interaction term between the total grain
yield measure (for raw grain yield) and month of birth. The result in column (9) of Table
4 shows the interaction term is insignificant.
As a robustness check, I also examine whether there is evidence of cross-dependence of
shocks: controlling for his or her own shocks in infancy, the exclusion restriction requires
that there is no dependence of one sibling’s height-for-age on shocks experienced during
the infancy of the other sibling. For example, one major threat to the identification
strategy would be reallocation of resources by households in response to an adverse event:
e.g., if following the birth of the second child, households preferentially direct resources to
either the first or the second child when a negative shock occurs. This would be evident
in a significant relationship between the older child’s height and the shock to the younger
child.
Note that coefficients on own shock and sibling shock cannot be estimated separately
in a household fixed effects specification. Accordingly, I will estimate an analogous spec-
ification replacing household fixed effects with county fixed effects κc and year-of-birth
fixed effects for the first-born child, γt,elder. (The same set of fixed effects will be used in
all subsequent robustness checks that exclude household fixed effects.) The equation of
interest is thus the following, where Sjct denotes the climatic shock for sibling j and ζhsct
denotes the household-specific error component. The raw grain yield variable is employed
in this test.
Hihsct = β1Sct + β2S
j
ct + β3Monihsct + β4Gihsct + κc + γt,elder + ζhsct + εihsct (6)
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Column (10) of Table 4 reports the results; the coefficient observed on the sibling shock
variable is negative, insignificant, and less than a third of the magnitude (in absolute
value) of the primary coefficient of interest.8 This suggests that cross-dependence of
shocks is not a major source of bias.
The magnitude of the coefficients for the grain yield measure indicates that a 25%
increase in grain yield in early childhood relative to the mean for one sibling, holding the
other sibling’s shock constant, will increase the difference in height-for-age between them
by about .40 on the scale of height-for-age Z-scores. This is equivalent to 34% of the mean
height-for-age in levels, and about four times the mean difference in height-for-age.9 In
other words, the mean difference in height between the older and younger siblings would
be eliminated if there were a counterfactual increase in grain yield in the older child’s
year of birth corresponding to one quarter of the standard deviation of grain yield across
counties and years.
3.3 Reduced form and two-stage least squares
Table 5 shows the reduced form results. The equations estimated are the following,
where again ηh denotes household fixed effects and controls for calendar month of birth
and gender are included.10
Eihsct = β1Sct + β2Monihsct + β3Gihsct + ηh + εihsct (7)
Eihsct = β1Ŝct + β2Monihsct + β3Gihsct + ηh + εihsct (8)
Panel A shows the results using the raw grain yield data. The first row shows the
results for the base specification; standard errors are again clustered by county. The
8If equation (6) is estimated excluding the sibling shock variable entirely, the estimated coefficient
β1 remains positive and significant. For the sake of concision, this specification is not reported, but the
tabulation is available upon request.
9The mean height-for-age Z score in this population is –1.1, and the mean difference in height is .1.
10Note that in this specification (as well as in the first stage already presented), there is no control
included for the children’s age or birth year. Conditional on household fixed effects, the primary source
of remaining variation in early childhood climatic shocks is derived from birth year; accordingly, adding
an additional control variable for birth year eliminates almost all residual variation in climatic shocks.
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second row converts four spending categories (transport/housing, food, tutoring, and
other) to dummy variables, given that a large number of zeros are observed in those
categories.11 The third row re-estimates the primary specification of interest, adding the
vector of school-level controls ξs that absorbs any heterogeneity in school characteristics.
There is variation within-household in school characteristics when the siblings attend
different schools, as is common when the elder child is enrolled in middle school and the
younger child is enrolled in primary school.12 The fourth row re-estimates the primary
specification, adding a linear control for grade level.
The coefficients are consistently negative, indicating that children born in a period
with more positive grain yield shocks receive less parental expenditure. The estimated
coefficient on enrollment is negative but insignificant; given that mean enrollment is
well over 90%, there is limited power to detect an effect on enrollment. The significant
effect on tuition evident in column (3) is rendered insignificant when grade level is added,
suggesting there is no robust evidence of an effect on tuition. I again report wild bootstrap
p-values for the primary reduced form results, and they are consistent with the estimated
standard errors.
It should be noted that both school characteristics and grade level attained could be
considered poor control variables insofar as they may represent outcomes that are also
determined by parents as part of a compensatory strategy. The key results are evident
both with and without these additional controls, and there is no significant difference in
the coefficients of interest, again with the exception of the effect for tuition. However,
given that older children have generally experienced more adverse climatic shocks in this
province, and they are also enrolled in higher grades in school, it is useful to note that the
11All measures of expenditure are set to zero for children not enrolled in school. The results remain
consistent if these measures of expenditure are instead coded as missing variables and the sample is
restricted only to children enrolled in school.
12School-level controls included are the type of school (primary, middle, or high), whether the school
is public or private, the number of classes per day, the number of weeks in the school year, the number of
boarding students at the school, the total number of students reported in the school, the percentage with
rural registration (hukou), the percentage who are ethnic minorities, the percentage of students absent
from school on the preceding day, and the number of teachers. All school characteristics are reported by
the principal. Distance from the household to the school is not reported by the household or the school.
For children not enrolled in school, school characteristics are set equal to zero.
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compensatory effect of more expenditure for children of lower height-for-age is evident
even conditioning on grade level. Further evidence around the robustness of these results
to variation in expenditure driven by sibling parity (i.e., whether the child is first- or
second-born) will be provided in Section 4.1.
Panel B of Table 5 shows the same specifications employing predicted grain yield as the
climatic shock variable; for concision, the specifications including school characteristics
and grade level controls are omitted. The same pattern of negative coefficients is observed,
generally of somewhat larger magnitude. The results are again robust to the use of the
wild bootstrap.
In the instrumental variables specification, the following equation is estimated, em-
ploying grain yield or predicted grain yield as an instrument for height-for-age Hihsct.
Eihsct = β1Hihsct + β2Monihsct + β3Gihsct + ηh + εihsct (9)
Table 6 reports the two-stage least squares results, employing grain yield as the instru-
ment in Panel A and predicted grain yield as the instrument in Panel B. The coefficients
on height-for-age are negative and significant, indicating that children with a greater en-
dowment receive less educational expenditure, and this is true with and without extensive
controls for school characteristics and grade fixed effects, across a range of expenditure
categories, and using both dummy and continuous measures of expenditure. I also report
in both panels p-values from an Anderson-Rubin test that is robust to potential bias
introduced by weak instruments; such bias may be a concern given that the F statistic
in the first stage was slightly over five. The results of this test are, however, largely
consistent with the primary results.
To interpret the magnitude of the coefficients, consider that the mean difference in
height-for-age between siblings is –.1 of a standard deviation, with the younger child on
average showing greater height-for-age. The estimates that employ grain yield as the
instrument and include school covariates suggest that in response to such a difference,
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parents would redirect around 29% of discretionary expenditure to the weaker child; the
estimates including a control for grade level suggest that the magnitude of the effect is
around 24%. The corresponding estimate using predicted grain yield as an instrument
suggest that the difference in discretionary expenditure in response to the average differ-
ence in height-for-age would be 17%. These differences in expenditure are evident across
sibling pairs in a variety of grade levels, suggesting that the cumulative impact could be
substantial if parents persist in such compensatory behavior.
The evidence presented here suggests that the hypothesis that parental allocations of
education are independent of children’s endowment can be rejected. Parental allocations
seem to favor the child with lower endowment, though there is no evidence of full special-
ization in either child. Given the nature of the sample employed, there are clearly some
important questions about the external validity of these results. Households represented
in this sample will generally be characterized by unusually strong preferences for multiple
children, as they have potentially risked adverse consequences and/or fines by having an
unsanctioned child; some of them may not have faced official sanctions, but simply made
use of exemptions to the policy that other households did not exploit.13 It is also possible
that they are characterized by unusually strong preferences for male children, and the
implications of this preference will be discussed further below.
Extrapolating from these results to a broader sample of multichild families requires
assumptions about whether parents who have a large number of children also have a
different preference for equality between children. The direction of this bias is not intu-
itively obvious, nor is it clearly predicted by basic theoretical models of intrahousehold
allocation that have primarily focused on identifying a relationship between the number
of children and the mean of parental investment, rather than intrahousehold variation in
that investment.
In this dataset, data is available on some sibling pairs who are the youngest two chil-
13Gu et al. (2007) estimate that “policy fertility” in Gansu, the average fertility rate if stated policies
were perfectly implemented, is 1.7. While family size in this purely rural sample is larger at 2.2, clearly
there are a substantial number of legal exemptions.
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dren of larger families. I also re-estimate the primary specifications, the reduced form in
equation (7) and the two-stage least squares in equation (9), using the larger sample, and
employing raw grain yield as the instrument of interest. The results are shown in Table
7.14 The estimated coefficients are again negative and significant, and in fact slightly
larger in magnitude (though the difference is not statistically significant). This is sugges-
tive evidence that the observed patterns may not be limited to two-child families. The
opposite exercise might also be of interest: examining intrahousehold allocation patterns
in households with a number of children, and thus a presumed preference for household
size, that is below the mean. Clearly, this empirical test cannot be implemented using
Chinese data given low overall fertility rates. However, given that low or rapidly declining
fertility rates characterize much of Europe as well as the richer Asian economies, pat-
terns of intrahousehold allocation in low-fertility environments where one-child families
are increasingly the norm may still be of interest from a policy perspective.
3.4 Other outcomes
In this dataset, disaggregated investments by child are reported for only one other cat-
egory of spending, investments in medical care. Data is available from two sources: the
mother reports the number of visits to a doctor or to a clinic or hospital for each child, as
well as the number of medical episodes and days of school missed due to sickness for each
child. Separately, the head of household (normally the father) reports medical expenses
for each child and the number of days ill over the last month.15
Investments in health care may be quite different from investments in education: these
investments are rarer (only around half of the sampled children are reported to have uti-
lized any medical care in the previous year), and may respond primarily to short-term
health challenges or emergencies. To test whether medical investments are also responsive
to measures of long-term endowment, I regress the available measures of medical invest-
14These estimates do not include the additional controls for school characteristics or grade level.
15There are a number of missing reports about doctors’ visits in the mother’s surveys, leading to the
slightly lower number of observations observed for these specifications.
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ment (the number of visits to a doctor and clinic, and actual monetary expenditure)
Emihsct on height-for-age in a specification parallel to the primary specification, estimated
with and without a control for medical necessity as reported by that parent, Mihsct. (For
maternal reports, this is the number of medical episodes or the days of school missed due
to sickness; for paternal reports, this is the number of days ill over the past month.)
Emihsct = β1Hihsct + β2Monihsct + β3Gihsct + β4Mihsct + ηh + εihsct (10)
This specification is estimated using two-stage least squares, instrumenting for height-
for-age with raw grain yield.16
The results are shown in Panel A of Table 8. The coefficients on height-for-age are
insignificant, while measures of medical expenditure are highly predictive as expected.17
This suggests that medical expenditure is not an important margin for compensation for
early childhood shocks.
In addition, the time invested by each household member, including children, in var-
ious activities such as leisure, household labor, and homework, is reported. Allowing
children to abstain from household chores or spend more time on academic pursuits may
also be plausibly considered a form of parental investment that could be responsive to
children’s endowments. Accordingly, I re-estimate equation (9) with dummy variables
equal to one if a child is reported to invest time in the specified activity as the dependent
variable. Dummy variables are employed given that, with the exception of television, no
more than 50%–60% of children are reported to spend time on each activity enumerated.
Note that there is no adding-up constraint imposed in the data collection procedure; some
parents report that their children spend very few hours on these activities combined, while
the mean total time reported is 22 hours.
The results are shown in Panel B of Table 8. It is evident that children of greater
16The results including predicted grain yield are comparable, but for concision are not reported.
17It should be noted, however, that the coefficients on height-for-age are of substantial magnitude,
albeit imprecisely estimated.
20
height-for-age allocate significantly more time to household labor, including fetching wa-
ter, chopping wood, and eldercare (though the latter coefficient is narrowly insignificant).
They are also significantly less likely to spend time on their own homework. Both phe-
nomena are consistent with children of lower height-for-age as a result of early childhood
shocks benefiting from a lighter allocation of household labor, and investing more time
in academic work, as a form of parental compensation. The magnitude suggests that the
probability of engaging in chores increases by around 10% in response to the average dif-
ference in height-for-age between children; the probability of investing time in homework
decreases by slightly less than 30%.
Taken together, these results constitute suggestive evidence that time allocation may
be another strategy of parental compensation for children of relatively weaker endowment.
There is, however, little evidence of an effect on investments in health care, with the caveat
that the estimated coefficients are imprecise.
3.5 Violations of the exclusion restriction
The exclusion restriction in the primary two-stage least squares specification assumes
that the only channel through which early childhood climatic shocks affect educational
expenditure, conditional on household fixed effects, is via nutritional availability and
hence the determination of the child’s height-for-age. One obvious set of outcomes that
are presumably affected by grain yield shocks would include the household’s wealth and
income. However, given that there is no variation in wealth or income conditional on
household fixed effects, this is not a source of bias in the main specification.
There are several potential additional channels through which early shocks could affect
height-for-age or educational investment in children other than via nutritional availability.
However, they all rely on shifts within the household that differentially affect the child
who is young at the time of the shock. First, if parents reallocate labor in response
to a climatic shock and this differentially affects the child who is infancy (and not, for
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example, an older child), this could be a source of bias.18 Second, if climatic shocks lead
to changes in household composition (due to temporary or permanent outmigration, for
example), these changes could also affect subsequent investment in education. Again, it
is necessary to assume that the shifting household composition differentially affects the
child who is an infant at the time of the shock. In this sample, it can be verified that
household composition as measured in the household survey is not correlated with the
climatic shocks in the children’s years of birth.19 It is not possible, however, to rule out
temporary migration in response to these shocks.
Third, if climatic shocks lead to changes in household attitudes toward education
(e.g., if parents change their perception of the relative returns of agricultural versus non-
agricultural occupations), this could be a source of bias. Again, it is necessary to assume
that this change primarily affects expenditure on the child who was in infancy during the
adverse shock. It is not obvious that this assumption is plausible, given that attitudinal
shifts would presumably affect educational expenditure on both children.
In addition, it is useful to note that if the primary channel through which climatic
shocks affect later educational expenditure is via shifts in household composition or
parental labor shocks, is is plausible that the effect of such shocks could persist beyond
the so-called “critical period” prior to age three. Changes in household composition or
attitudes presumably would shift parental expenditure on children, even if these changes
occur at a point when the children have already entered school. However, evidence pre-
sented in Section 4.4 will suggest that climatic shocks have no effect on educational
expenditure if they occur after the first three years of life. This is consistent with the
assumption that there are no meaningful channels through which early childhood climatic
shocks affect subsequent educational expenditure, conditional on household fixed effects,
other than via the determination of height-for-age.
18There is some evidence in a companion paper using the same dataset, Leight et al. (2015), that
labor supply shocks are an important channel through which climatic shocks affect height-for-age in a
cross-household analysis.
19Tabulations are not reported, but are available upon request.
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4 Robustness checks
4.1 Sibling parity effects
There is a trend in climatic shocks in Gansu in the period of interest – more specifically,
the mean of the grain yield difference between the first-born and second-born children is
positive. This suggests that sibling parity (i.e., birth order) could be a source of bias in
this specification, if the evident preference for the relatively weaker child in fact reflects
a preference for the first-born child. Accordingly, I re-estimate the primary specification
adding a linear control for sibling parity, Pihsct. The equation estimated can be written
as follows, and grain yield is employed as an instrument for height-for-age.
Eihsct = β1Hihsct + β2Monihsct + β3Gihsct + β4Pihsct + ηh + εihsct (11)
The results of estimating equation (11) are shown in Panel A of Table 9; standard
errors are again clustered by county. For this and subsequent robustness checks, I report
only the results using the raw grain yield measure as an instrument for concision. The
results show the same negative relationship between height-for-age and educational ex-
penditure evident in the primary results, and coefficients on sibling parity that are small
in magnitude and generally insignificant. There is some evidence that first-born children
are more likely to be enrolled in school – perhaps unsurprising, given their older age –
and they seem to spend more on school supplies. However, these effects are small in
magnitude relative to the estimated coefficients on height-for-age (with the exception of
the coefficient on tuition, where the magnitudes are comparable).
This suggests that a preference for the first-born child is unlikely to be the primary
omitted variable driving the main results. Comparing the magnitude of the coefficient on
height-for-age to the coefficient estimated in the primary specification, the estimated co-
efficients in specification (11) are slightly smaller, though the difference is not statistically
significant.
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4.2 Gender and intrahousehold allocation
A second potential confounding factor is gender. Given the evidence from other sources of
gender bias in household decision-making in China, the effect of gender on parental alloca-
tions may outweigh any observed effect for endowment. While the primary specifications
included gender as a control variable, this may not be regarded as fully satisfactory given
the abundant anthropological and demographic evidence on abortion, abandonment, or
underreporting of female children in China (Coale and Banister, 1994; Qian, 1997); it is
implausible to assume that the gender of both children can be assumed to be random.20
In Gansu, the sex ratio in 2000 was 111.2, close to the national average of 113.6, and
indicative of substantial household determination of child gender (Banister, 2004). Ac-
cordingly, households with different gender balances among their children are likely to
differ materially along other observable and unobservable dimensions.
The gender of the first child, however, may be a plausibly exogenous observation, as
anthropological evidence indicates that selection for gender occurs principally in births
subsequent to a first-born daughter, and selective abortion prior to the birth of a first
child is unusual (Gu et al., 2007; Banister, 2004). The evidence in this sample is consistent
with this hypothesis. The sex ratio for the first child is not significantly different from .5,
while for the second-born child, the sex ratio is highly imbalanced: 67% of second-born
children are male. However, the sex ratio for the second child in households with a first-
born male is likewise not significantly different from .5. Households choosing to bear a
second child following the birth of a son do not engage in costly sex-selection methods in
order to bear a second son.
Accordingly, in households with a first-born son, the gender of both children can
plausibly be considered to be quasi-random. In order to test the robustness of the pri-
mary results to bias introduced by unobservable gender preferences among parents, I
re-estimate the primary specification equation (9), restricting the sample to households
with a first-born son and employing grain yield as an instrument. The estimation results
20The primary results are also robust to the exclusion of the gender variable.
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are shown in Table 9, and the pattern of negative and significant coefficients is consistent
with the primary results. While the coefficients observed are generally somewhat smaller
in magnitude, the difference is not statistically significant.
4.3 Selection bias
Selection into the sample of two-child families observed in this analysis would also con-
stitute a violation of the exclusion restriction. If families with certain characteristics
are more or less likely to suffer an adverse mortality event as the result of the same
climatic shock, then the pattern of shocks may affect the ultimate pattern of allocations
by determining the surviving number of children, and hence inclusion or exclusion in the
sample.
Due to the absence of complete data on retrospective familial mortality, it is not
possible to directly examine child mortality as a function of varying climatic shocks. An
alternative strategy to test for selection effects exploits the presence of extremely severe
climatic shocks that are most likely to be associated with increased mortality. If there
is selective survival among children born in those years, this would likely produce an
attenuation toward zero in an otherwise positive relationship between grain yield shocks
and height-for-age. This reflects the fact that surviving children, while weakened by
adverse conditions in infancy, are nonetheless likely to be genetically more robust and
thus have a propensity toward greater health, weakening the correlation between grain
yield and height-for-age.
On the other hand, if selection via differential mortality is not an important phe-
nomenon, there should not be an attenuation of the relationship between shocks and
health outcomes as the severity of the shock increases – assuming that the relationship
between grain yield and height-for-age is otherwise linear. This is clearly a strong as-
sumption, and accordingly the results should be interpreted with caution.
To test this hypothesis, dummy variables are defined to capture severe climatic shocks
of varying intensity. A severe shock is identified when total grain yield in the critical
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period of interest (in utero and in the first and second years of life) falls below the 20th,
30th, 40th, 50th, and 60th percentiles, respectively. The first stage equation conditional
on household fixed effects is then re-estimated, adding these dummy variables and an
interaction between the dummy variable and the linear grain yield term. For example,
the following equation shows the specification employing a dummy variable for grain yield
below the 20th percentile.
Hihsct = β1Sct + β2D
20
ihsct × Sct + β3D20ihsct + ηh + εihsct (12)
The objective is to test whether the slope of the positive relationship between grain
yield and height-for-age is attenuated toward zero in the lower part of the climatic shock
distribution, a phenomenon that would be evident in a negative coefficient on β2.
The results are shown in Panel A of Table 10. The coefficients β2 are positive and
generally significant, suggesting that selective mortality is not a particularly relevant
phenomenon in this sample. In fact, the positive relationship between grain yield shocks
and height-for-age is larger in magnitude for children in the lower part of the height-for-age
distribution. While these results may partially reflect non-linearities in the relationship
between grain yield and height-for-age independent of selective mortality, the results here
would only be consistent with selective mortality if there are very large non-linearities in
this relationship at low levels of grain yield, rendering the relationship of interest positive
rather than negative. While these results must be interpreted cautiously, they seem to
be consistent with the absence of any significant phenomenon of selective mortality.
Another channel through which selection bias could occur is if parents respond to the
climatic shock experienced in the first year of their eldest child’s life by altering their
fertility. If the probability that they have a second (or higher parity) child is altered,
this would also affect their probability of entering the sample. In order to examine this
correlation, dummy variables equal to one if a household has a second (or third) child,
as well as dummy variables corresponding to the gender of the second (or third) child,
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are regressed on the climatic shock variable for the first (or second) child, conditional on
county and year fixed effects. Years between the birth of the first and second child is
also employed as a dependent variable, given that previous evidence has suggested that
increased spacing between births may be a strategy employed by some parents to enable
greater investment in the child born earlier (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1988).
The specifications of interest are thus the following, where Fhct denotes a fertility
outcome (a dummy for the birth of a second or third child, gender of the second or third
child, or years between the first and second birth) for household h with first-born child in
year t in county c, and F̃hcy denotes a fertility outcome (dummy for the birth of a third
child and gender of the third child) for household h with second-born child in year y in
county c. S denotes the corresponding climatic shock for the child of interest, and γ are
year of birth fixed effects for the child of interest.21 ζ again denotes the household-specific
error component.
Fhct = βStc + κc + γt,elder + ζhct (13)
F̃hcy = βScy + κc + γy,younger + ζhcy (14)
(15)
The results are shown in Panel B of Table 10.22 In general, there is no evidence of
a relationship between early-life shocks for infants and the probability of a later birth.
This suggests that parents’ subsequent fertility decisions are not shaped by the climatic
shock experienced in the first year of life by their first-born child.
There is some evidence, apparent in column (2) of the same table, of a negative
21The climatic shock S is again defined as the mean of grain yield in utero and in the first and second
years of life, parallel to the main analysis. I use raw grain yield measures rather than predicted grain
yield.
22The sample for these specifications include all households for whom month of birth is reported for
the first-born child, allowing the construction of the grain yield variable of interest. Month of birth was
only reported for children who participated in the anthropometric data collection. For this reason, the
sample size is lower than the full sample size of 1918.
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relationship between the grain yield shock for the first-born child and the gender of the
second child. Parents who have a positive shock in their first child’s year of birth are
subsequently more likely to have a boy; this could be interpreted as evidence of an income
effect, as households having experienced a positive shock may be more able to invest in
costly technology to manipulate the gender of a subsequent child. Given that the effect
of gender on educational expenditure is not large in this sample, however, this is not a
significant source of bias.
Taken together, these results suggest that selection into the observed subsample of
two-children families is unlikely to be a major phenomenon, and households represented in
this subsample have not exhibited significantly different patterns of fertility or mortality.
4.4 Placebo tests
A large existing literature already cited suggests that climatic shocks after the critical
period of development in early childhood do not plausibly have a substantial impact on
height-for-age, conditional on household fixed effects. While there is no consensus on
when this critical period ends, age three is often cited as a cut-off point. Moreover,
the postulated exclusion restriction for the main specification of interest here suggests
that if climatic shocks later in childhood do not affect height-for-age, they should not
subsequently determine the intrahousehold allocation of educational expenditure. Ac-
cordingly, estimating the impact of shocks after age three on the dependent variables of
interest serves as a useful placebo test.
In order to conduct this test, I identify grain yield shocks in the county of residence in
years four and five of life, denoted S+4ct and S
+5
ct respectively, and re-estimate the reduced
form for four expenditure outcomes (tuition, total discretionary expenditure, supplies,
and transportation/housing). I employ shocks in year four as the earliest placebo shock
given the identification of the period before age three as the critical period of early
childhood development in the literature.
For each shock, the sample is restricted to sibling pairs in which the younger child
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is at least three by the year of the shock: i.e., for grain yield at age four, the sample is
restricted to sibling pairs where the age gap is no more than a year, such that the younger
child is three by the time the older child is four. The equation of interest can thus be
written as follows for the shock four years after birth.
Eihsct = β1S
+4
ct + β2Monihsct + β3Gihsct + ηh + εihsct (16)
I also re-estimate the main reduced form specification (7) with the primary grain yield
shock as the independent variable, but employing the restricted sample, in order to
compare the coefficients for the sample of interest. For concision, I employ the simple
grain yield measure, rather than predicted grain yield.
The results are shown in Table 11; in each panel, columns (1) through (4) report the
placebo tests, while columns (5) through (8) report specifications employing the restricted
sample and the primary grain yield shock of interest. It is evident that the coefficients on
the shocks in years four and five are small in magnitude and not statistically significant.
By contrast, the effect of the primary grain yield shock remains large in magnitude, even
in this restricted sample, and significant in all specifications except one.
In the bottom row of each panel, I report the results of Wald tests for equality of coef-
ficients across the specifications using the shocks in years four and five and the analogous
specifications using the primary grain yield shock. For each specification, the p-value
tests the equality of the coefficient on the placebo shock and the primary grain yield
shock using the same sample; for example, the p-value in column (1) of Panel A tests
equality of the coefficients across columns (1) and (5) of that panel. For the year four
shocks, equality of the coefficients can be rejected for two of the four measures of expen-
diture, and for the third, the specification narrowly fails to reject at the 10 percent level.
For the year five shocks, equality of the coefficient in the placebo test and the primary
coefficient of interest can be rejected for all four measures of expenditure. This evidence
suggests that climatic shocks later in childhood do not significantly determine parental
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allocation of educational expenditure, consistent with the assumption that the channel
of causality for the primary results runs through the effect of climatic shocks on child
development during a critical period in infancy.
5 Conclusion
In the previous literature on intrahousehold allocation, the question of the presence or
absence of family aversion to inequality has received extensive analytical attention. How-
ever, little evidence has been presented regarding the nature of parental responses to
systematic differences in physical endowment among children, particularly non-twins.
I employ an identification strategy that relies on the correlation between climatic vari-
ation and height-for-age, mediated through the impact of nutritional shocks in infancy. I
find a pattern of preferential allocations of discretionary educational expenditure to chil-
dren of lower endowment, consistent with a parental preference for equality of outcomes.
The relationship is robust across multiple specifications and measures of expenditure, and
robust to the inclusion of both gender and sibling parity. These results imply that, at
least in education, the household is serving as a mechanism for the mitigation of existing
inequalities. There is, however, no evidence that health expenditure follows a similar
pattern.
These results raise the question of whether the observed allocation favoring the weaker
child is a compensatory response intended to provide consumption-like educational ben-
efits to children with lower endowments, or whether this allocation strategy reflects dif-
ferential returns to educational expenditure for children of differing levels of endowment.
If, for example, educational expenditure has higher returns for the child with a lower en-
dowment – or more accurately, is perceived by parents to have higher returns – then the
observed strategy could be interpreted as maximizing returns to educational investment.
While no robust evidence on this point is available in my sample, a survey of the
mothers of the sampled children does collect information on the level of education she
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expects each to attain. A simple test of the perceptions of the returns to educational
expenditure on different children can be implemented by regressing this expectation on
reported expenditure, height-for-age, and the interaction between the two, conditional on
household fixed effects, and instrumenting for height-for-age with grain yield in infancy.
This test shows no evidence that returns to expenditure are perceived by mothers to
be systematically different for children of varying height-for-age.23 While this evidence
must be considered only suggestive, it is consistent with parents seeking to provide a
consumption-like benefit to children of lower initial endowment, rather than responding
to systematic differences in returns to expenditure across different children.
For the purposes of the welfare analysis of potential household interventions, this
is an encouraging result that suggests that household-level interventions may improve
welfare outcomes for the weakest members of a family. Policies that aim to increase
human capital investment for struggling children are typically targeted at a household
level. Even if a transfer is specifically designated for a particular child, this provision is
challenging to observe or enforce, and parental reallocation of other consumption may
undo any intended benefit for the child of interest. However, this study provides evidence
that household processes of allocation in the rural Chinese context favor the direction of
human capital resources toward children that have experienced negative shocks and the
associated negative health effects. This may provide a higher degree of confidence that
external transfers to these households will in fact benefit their more vulnerable children.
23Tabulations available on request.
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6 Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics
Panel A: Demographic data Panel B: Educational expenditure per child
Sample Subsample p-value Mean Std. Dev. Max.
Net income 6791.97 6169.01 .352 Total 260.27 311.48 4240
Net income agri. 2618.84 2444.59 .276 Discretionary 97.88 181.11 2240
Income per capita 1705.01 1525.74 .234 Tuition 162.4 170.08 2000
Father educ. 7.11 6.88 .142 Supplies 35.67 38.26 300
Mother educ. 4.29 4.1 .199 Transport/Housing 11.81 45.66 600
Father age 42.62 38.95 .061 Food 35.5 115.02 1700
Mother age 39.25 36.88 0 Tutoring 5.41 16.02 100
Index child age 15.1 15.01 .081 Other fees 9.49 27.73 360
Height-for-age -1.19 -1.31 .017
Obs. 1918 413
Note: The sample encompasses the full sample of households that report income data; this is 1918 out of the full sample
of 2000 households in the survey. The subsample is households with two-children families in which both children report
anthropometric data. There are 413 households in the subsample of interest, and 826 children. Income is reported in
yuan; educational expenditure is reported in yuan per semester. The third column in Panel A reports the p-value for a
test of equality of means across the sample and subsample. All variables are reported in the second survey wave collected
in 2004.
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Table 2: OLS
Enrollment Total Discretionary Tuition Supplies Trans./Housing Food Tutoring Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Height-for-age .009 -7.259 -6.676 -.584 -1.897 -.503 -4.473 .715 -.519
(.009) (11.079) (7.254) (7.135) (1.016)∗ (1.246) (5.938) (.502) (.708)
Mean (levels) .95 260.27 97.88 162.4 35.67 11.81 35.5 5.41 9.49
Median (levels) 1 180 40 125 25 0 0 0 0
Mean (dif.) -.07 -145.06 -79.15 -65.9 -13.37 -14.16 -39.78 -5.58 -6.26
Obs. 826 826 826 826 826 826 826 826 826
Note: The dependent variable is educational expenditure on a given child in the specified category; the independent
variable is height-for-age. All regressions include household fixed effects, controls for birth month and gender, and
standard errors clustered by county. The mean in differences reports the mean intra-household difference in expenditure
(between the first and second child) in the specified category.
* p < .1
** p < .05
*** p < .01
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Table 8: Other outcomes: Medical investments and time allocation
Panel A: Medical investments
Doctor Clinic Med. expend.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Height-for-age -.002 .033 -.007 -.139 -.085 -.142 -408.183 -420.997
(.046) (.056) (.042) (.086) (.071) (.091) (429.875) (433.259)
Med. episodes .268 .341
(.084)∗∗∗ (.121)∗∗∗
Days missed .413 .468
(.091)∗∗∗ (.177)∗∗∗
Days sick 2533.150
(1292.865)∗
Mean (levels) .4 .4 .4 .49 .49 .49 164.52 164.52
Median (levels) 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10
Mean (differences) -.05 -.05 -.05 -.08 -.08 -.08 -14.13 -14.13
Obs. 799 799 799 826 826 826 826 826
Panel B: Time allocation
TV Cooking Washing Chopping Water Elder HW Playing Homework
wood care help
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Height-for-age .037 -.083 -.085 .163 .232 .119 .065 .037 -1.366
(.044) (.094) (.085) (.105) (.125)∗ (.080) (.085) (.101) (.404)∗∗∗
Mean (levels) .86 .33 .59 .13 .29 .21 .32 .55 .45
Median (levels) 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
Mean (differences) -.03 -.09 -.06 .14 .21 .07 -.02 -.01 -.86
Obs. 826 826 826 826 826 826 826 826 826
Note: The dependent variables in Panel A are measure of medical investment (whether the child has seen a doctor or
visited a clinic in the last year, and medical expenditure in the last year). The independent variables are height-for-age
instrumented by the mean of reported grain yield in utero and in the first and second years of life, and various measures
of medical necessity/need as reported by the parents. The dependent variables in Panel B are a dummy variable equal to
one if the child reports time invested in the specified activity and zero otherwise, and the independent variable is
height-for-age instrumented by the mean of reported grain yield in utero and in the first and second years of life. All
regressions include household fixed effects, controls for birth month and gender, and standard errors clustered by county.
* p < .1
** p < .05
*** p < .01
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Table 10: Selection into the sample
Panel A: Early shocks and selective mortality
Cutoff for severe shock
20th perc. 30th perc. 40th perc. 50th perc. 60th perc. 70th perc.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Grain yield .484 .474 .456 .486 .479 .478
(.124)∗∗∗ (.120)∗∗∗ (.117)∗∗∗ (.108)∗∗∗ (.109)∗∗∗ (.114)∗∗∗
Yield x Severe shock 1.156 1.513 1.629 1.816 1.219 .693
(.860) (.777)∗ (.620)∗∗∗ (.922)∗∗ (1.149) (1.070)
Severe shock -2.120 -2.670 -3.158 -3.062 -2.379 -1.807
(1.269)∗ (1.336)∗∗ (1.457)∗∗ (1.985) (2.609) (2.678)
Obs. 826 826 826 826 826 826
Panel B: Early shocks and subsequent fertility
Second child Third child
Birth Gender Spacing Birth Gender Birth Gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Grain yield child 1 -.003 -.024 -.032 .003 -.052
(.010) (.006)∗∗∗ (.026) (.003) (.344)
Grain yield child 2 .006 -.171
(.012) (.357)
Obs. 1743 711 1743 1743 125 693 99
Note: In Panel A, the dependent variable is height-for-age, and the independent variable is the primary grain yield shock
(the mean of grain yield in utero and in the first and second year of life), a dummy for the grain yield shock falling under
the specified percentile threshold, and an interaction between the dummy and the linear grain yield term. All regressions
include household fixed effects, controls for birth month and gender, and standard errors clustered by county. In Panel B,
the dependent variables are dummy variables for the birth of a second- or third-parity child, the gender of a second- or
third-parity child, and the number of years between the births of the first and second child. The independent variable is
the primary grain yield shock for the specified child. All regressions include year of birth fixed effects for the specified
child, county fixed effects, and standard errors clustered at the county level. Asterisks denote significance at 1, 5 and 10
percent levels.
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